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09/707,655	11/07/2000	Alan R. Hirsch	INS-31061-A	9326
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WHYTE HIRSCHBOECK DUDEK S C			EXAMINER	
111 EAST WISCONSIN AVENUE SUITE 2100			TATE, CHRISTOPHER ROBIN	
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

Paper No. 16

Application Number: 09/707,655 Filing Date: 07 November 2000

Appellant(s): Hirsch

Kristine M. Strodhoff

For Appellant

EXAMINER'S ANSWER

This is in response to the appeal brief filed September 3, 2002.

(1) Real Party in Interest

A statement identifying the real party in interest is contained in the brief.

(2) Related Appeals and Interferences

A statement identifying the related appeals and interferences which will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the decision in the pending appeal is contained in the brief.

(3) Status of Claims

The statement of the status of the claims contained in the brief is correct.

(4) Status of Amendments After Final

The appellant's statement of the status of amendments after final rejection contained in the brief is correct.

(5) Summary of Invention

The summary of invention contained in the brief is correct.

(6) Issues

The appellant's statement of the issues in the brief is correct.

(7) Grouping of Claims

Appellant's brief includes a statement that claims stand together (see page 3 of Appellant's Brief).

(8) Claims Appealed

The copy of the appealed claims contained in the Appendix to the brief is correct.

(9) Prior Art of Record

The following is a listing of the prior art of record relied upon in the rejection of claims under appeal.

Doty et al. "The Smell Identification Test™ Administrative Manual".

Philadelphia Sensorics, Inc. (1983), 22 pages.

(10) Grounds of Rejection

The following ground(s) of rejection are applicable to the appealed claims:

Claims 24-33, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, and 44-46 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph because specification, while being enabling for an article of manufacturer having the unusual disclosed/claimed functional effect (increasing and/or decreasing blood flow to the vagina) comprising the particular commercial odorants (see, e.g., page 12, lines 1-13 of the instant specification) and/or mixtures thereof instantly demonstrated, does not reasonably provide enablement for an article of manufacturer having the unusual disclosed functional effect comprising any undefined odorant therein and/or mixtures of subjective odorants instantly claimed. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.

Appellant has reasonably demonstrated that the particular commercial odorants (see, e.g., page 12, lines 1-13 of the instant specification) act to alter blood flow to the vagina via inhaling an effective amount thereof. However, the claims encompass an article of manufacturer designed for such unusual use comprising any undefined odorant and/or the various mixtures of subjective

odorants instantly claimed which is clearly beyond the scope of the instantly disclosed invention. The instantly claimed odorants are highly subjective with respect to the actual odors being encompassed and, thus, are not enabled - e.g., based upon the ingredients within a given recipe of pumpkin pie or banana nut bread, numerous distinct odors particular to that given recipe would be emitted therefrom. This is also the case for baby powder, which is actually talc to which a particular perfume is added and which varies by commercial manufacturer; and is also the case for cucumber (e.g., based upon the brand, species, age/ripeness, geographic location in which it is grown, etc.), licorice-based odorants (e.g., Good N' PlentyTM has a distinct odor from that of some other licorice based products such as anise), and chocolate (e.g., milk chocolate has a distinct odor from dark chocolate). In addition, it is noted in several instances of the instant disclosure that using the same odorant or mixture of odorants which cause an increased blood flow to the vagina to some females also cause a decrease in blood flow to the vagina in other females. Further, as disclosed by Doty (Philadelphia Sensorics, 1983), there are numerous variables such as an individual's occupation, general health, psychological state, and age which play a role in assessing sensory function of smell (see, e.g., pages 16-18). Therefore, altering blood flow to the vagina via the inhalation of such odorants, including the undefined odorant (see, e.g., claim 25) and/or the mixtures of broadly defined odorants instantly claimed, is considered to be highly unpredictable between females based upon such variables.

Accordingly, it would take undue experimentation without a reasonable expectation of success for one of skill in the art to prepare and use an article of manufacture having the unusual disclosed/claimed functional effect, other than using one of the particular demonstrated

commercial odorants or mixtures thereof, in an amount effective to provide the claimed alteration in blood flow to the vagina.

Claims 24, 26-33, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, and 44-46 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

The metes and bounds of the mixtures of subjective odorants instantly claimed are not clearly nor adequately delineated making the claims unclear. For example, based upon the ingredients within a given recipe of pumpkin pie or banana nut bread, numerous distinct odors particular to that given recipe would be emitted therefrom. This is also the case for baby powder, which is actually tale to which a particular perfume is added and which varies by commercial manufacturer; and is also the case for cucumber (e.g., based upon the brand, species, age/ripeness, geographic location in which it is grown, etc.), licorice-based odorants (e.g., Good and Plenty™ has a distinct odor from that of some other licorice based products such as anise or other products having licorice as a base in combination with other ingredients), and chocolate (e.g., milk chocolate has a distinct odor from dark chocolate). The subjective nature of the mixtures of recited odorants (any of which is deemed essential in terms of adequately defining these particular active ingredients within the claimed article of manufacture) causes these claims to be very ambiguous and unclear.

(11) Response to Argument

Appellant argues that the Examiner has provided no good basis for his position regarding the U.S.C. 112, first and second paragraph rejections above with respect to the scope of enablement rejection (112, first paragraph) and the metes and bounds of the claimed mixture of subjective odorants not being clearly nor adequately delineated (112, second paragraph).

Appellant argues that, first of all, the Examiner erroneously contends that the claims encompass "any undefined odorant and/or the various mixtures of subjective odorants" instantly claimed, and that the pending claims are directed to an article comprising specified mixtures of odorants. However, claim 25 is, in fact, drawn to an article of manufacture comprising any and all undefined odorants (please note that claim 25 was not rejected under U.S.C. 112, second paragraph because although the term "odorant" is broad, it is not indefinite, per se, since there are numerous well known defined odorants including the particular defined commercial odorants instantly disclosed - e.g., those listed on page 12, lines 1-13 of the instant specification which include Chanel No. 5 perfume and Good N' PlentyTM candy odorants). Appellant also argues that the Examiner merely asserts that the instantly claimed odorants are highly subjective with respect to the actual odors being encompassed, stating that a given recipe of pumpkin pie or banana nut bread varies according to the ingredients, baby powder varies by commercial manufacturer, cucumber varies based upon the brand, species, age/ripeness, geographic location in which it is grown, etc., licorice-based odorants such as Good and PlentyTM (as disclosed in the instant specification) has a distinct odor from that of some other licorice based products such as anise, and chocolate such as milk chocolate has a distinct odor from dark chocolate. However, this is

not merely an assertion by the Examiner because such odors are, in fact, highly subjective for these very reasons (as discussed above). How can they not be?

Appellant further argues that the Examiner asserts that the use of other odorants would be highly unpredictable between females and should be limited to the commercially identified odorants instantly disclosed (see, e.g., page 12, lines 1-13 of the instant specification) because the same mixture of odorants can cause an increased blood flow to the vagina in some females and a decreased blood flow in the vagina of other females. However, this argument by itself, shows the highly unpredictable nature of such odorants and odorant mixtures upon a given female. Also, the nature of the claimed/disclosed invention can be considered to be a female ViagraTM (i.e., those odorants which are disclosed as causing an increase in blood flow to the vagina) since ViagraTM is used to increase blood flow to the penis of a male and there have been countless unsuccessful attempts over the centuries to devise various types of female sexual arousal formulations.

In addition, Appellant argues that the Examiner cites Doty et al. without any basis for support to show that variables such as occupation, general heath, psychological state and age, make the use of other odorants highly unpredictable between females. However, although the Doty et al. reference is mainly directed to tests for identifying odorants, the overall teachings of Doty et al. show that, in general, these variables play a role in the ability of a person to perceive a given odor (and also that women and men perceive odors differently with regard to intensity, pleasantness, coolness/warmth, irritation, and familiarity - see, e.g., page 4 of Doty et al).

Accordingly, it would not be reasonable for one of skill in the art to wholly dissociate such

variables in the smell perception of an odor from the physiological effect(s) the perceived odor has upon an individual, including a female individual.

In addition, Appellant argues that other issued patents (some by the Appellant) claim various odorants for various methods of treatment. However, this argument is not deemed persuasive for two reasons. Firstly, the merits of the instant application, including the Office actions of record, stand on their own. Secondly, this argument is not relevant to the instant teachings with respect to odorants having the unusual functional effects upon females as instantly disclosed/claimed.

For the above reasons, it is believed that the rejections should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

Christopher Tate September 30, 2002

Conferees

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